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Wedderburn and the Theory of Labour Law:  
Building on Kahn-Freund 
Ruth Dukes* 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper aims to assess the nature and significance of Lord Wedderburn’s contribution to the 
elaboration of a theory of labour law.  Noting the extent to which Wedderburn was influenced, in 
this respect as in others, by the work of Otto Kahn-Freund, it focuses on the question of whether 
Wedderburn ever developed a theory of labour law that was clearly distinguishable from Kahn-
Freund’s.  Were there significant differences in the two scholars’ expositions of abstentionism, 
or collective laissez-faire?  Through a close reading of Wedderburn’s work, it is suggested that 
Wedderburn was a strong proponent of the principle of collective laissez-fare, in his early as well 
as his later writing.  In the changed political context of the 1980s and 1990s, he undertook the 
important task of seeking to update or restate the principle as an expression of social-democratic 
values in the field of work and working relationships. 
 
I. Introduction 
 
In his approach to scholarship, and in terms of the substance of his position on the theory of 
labour law, there can be little doubt that Lord Wedderburn (1927-2012) was strongly influenced 
by the work of Otto Kahn-Freund (1900-1975).1  This is hardly surprising given the time at 
which Wedderburn began researching and teaching the subject.  The two were contemporaries, 
but Wedderburn was firmly the more junior, both in years and as a scholar of labour law.  When 
he first became fellow of Clare College Cambridge in 1951, Kahn-Freund had been 15 years in 
post at the London School of Economics, with additional years of scholarship and legal practice 
                                                          
* School of Law, University of Glasgow.  I’m grateful to the Editor for the invitation to contribute to this issue and 
to Bob Hepple, Mark Freedland, Paul Smith, Alan Bogg and Hugh Collins for very helpful comments on an earlier 
draft.  The subtitle is taken from Lord Wedderburn, J Lewis, R Clark (eds), Labour Law and Industrial Relations: 
Building on Kahn-Freund (Oxford 1983). 
 
1 B Hepple, ‘Wedderburn’s The Worker and the Law: an Appreciation’ (2013) 34 Historical Studies in Industrial 
Relations 215-27, 218 FN 24: Wedderburn ‘emulated’ the ‘method that Kahn-Freund imbibed’ from Sinzheimer. 
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behind him in the Weimar Republic.2  When Wedderburn first devised a course on ‘industrial 
law’ in Cambridge in 1961, the writings of Kahn-Freund, including the famous 1950s collective 
laissez-faire trilogy, were prominent amongst the materials available to draw on.3  Most 
importantly perhaps, Kahn-Freund’s writing – both the substance of his analysis and his 
methodology or approach – fitted well with Wedderburn’s existing political convictions and 
trade union sympathies.  Emulation of the older scholar’s method allowed him to make the kinds 
of argument that he wished to make.      
 
The central aim of this article is to address the question whether it is possible to identify a theory 
of labour law in Wedderburn’s work that is clearly distinguishable from Kahn-Freund’s.  In 
order to identify and assess Wedderburn’s position, the article focuses on his exposition of the 
notion of abstentionism, or collective laissez-faire, exploring the question of differences in the 
thinking of the two scholars.4  In a third section, extended consideration is given to the 
recommendations of the Bullock Committee as a matter over which they famously disagreed.5 
 
In the course of the article, it is suggested that in his earlier writing, Wedderburn followed the 
teachings of Kahn-Freund closely, adopting the principle of collective laissez-faire with 
enthusiasm as a framework through which to present an analysis of labour law as a single, 
coherent legal discipline.  In places, he appeared to express a degree of scepticism, even, 
regarding the value of law as a means of furthering the interests of workers.  Citing Kahn-Freund 
with approval, he suggested that the British system was best understood as ‘abstentionist’, 
straightforwardly understood in terms of a withdrawal of the state from the arena of industrial 
relations.  In later writing – in particular on the question of the desirable response of scholars to 
                                                          
2 Kahn-Freund was appointed to a lectureship at the LSE in 1936 and promoted to Professor in 1951: M 
Freedland,‘Otto Kahn-Freund’ in J Beatson and R Zimmermann (eds), Jurists uprooted: German-speaking émigré 
lawyers in twentieth-century Britain (Oxford 2004). 
3 O Kahn-Freund, ‘Legal Framework’ in A Flanders and H A Clegg, The System of Industrial Relations in Great 
Britain (Oxford 1954); O Kahn-Freund, ‘Intergroup Conflicts and their Settlement’ (1954) 5 British Journal of 
Sociology 193-227; O Kahn-Freund, ‘Labour Law’ in M Ginsberg (ed) Law and Opinion in England in the 20th 
Century (Stevens 1959).    
4 As is explained in the course of the paper, Wedderburn tended, in his early work, to use the terms ‘abstentionism’ 
and ‘collective laissez-faire’ interchangeably, emphasising, like Kahn-Freund, the degree to which the British state 
had chosen to ‘abstain’ from involvement in the field of industrial relations.  In later work, he sought to restate or 
redefine collective laissez-faire so as to divorce it from the notion of state abstentionism. 
5 ie The Committee of Inquiry on Industrial Democracy, chaired by Lord Bullock, which reported in 1977.  See 
section III below. 
3 
 
the policies and legislation of the Conservative governments of the 1980s and 90s – Wedderburn 
was arguably more optimistic than Kahn-Freund had been regarding the capacity of legislation to 
effect positive change, though he did not ever lose or revise his scepticism regarding the capacity 
of the ordinary courts to decide industrial disputes in a truly objective manner.  Focusing on what 
he now presented as the core ‘values’ underpinning the notion of collective laissez-faire, he 
advocated the continued use of the principle as a means of countering the increasingly 
hegemonic free market ideology of Friedrich Hayek and others: of defending collectivism and 
free trade unionism as necessary for the achievement of social justice.  While it might be difficult 
to argue, then, that Wedderburn ever developed a theory of labour law that was wholly 
distinguishable from collective laissez-faire, he did undertake the very important task of 
explaining, expanding upon, and updating the principle as an expression of social-democratic 
values in the field of work and working relationships.    
 
 
II. The Worker and the Law 
 
Most workers want nothing more of the law than that it should leave them alone.6 
 
In the very significant body of work published by Wedderburn in the field of labour law over the 
course of a long career, the three editions of the textbook The Worker and the Law occupy a 
central position.  The first edition of the text appeared in 1965, and the second and third in 1971 
and 1986, each substantially revised and progressively longer.  Extending by the last of these to 
over 800 pages, the texts today offer numerous valuable insights, not only into the state of the 
law and industrial relations at the time, but also into the thinking of the author as it developed 
during more than two decades.   
 
As Bob Hepple has argued, expressing his ‘appreciation’ of the work in 2013, the first edition of 
The Worker and the Law made a major contribution to labour law scholarship in the UK by 
providing for the first time a comprehensive account of the whole field: demarcating boundaries 
                                                          
6 KW Wedderburn, The Worker and the Law, 1st ed, (Harmondsworth 1965). 1 
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with other legal disciplines, and analysing ‘all’ of the relevant law.7  Other textbooks then 
available failed to present labour law as a single, coherent subject, offering instead only a rather 
limited, black-letter analysis of a sometimes seemingly disparate collection of legal rules – the 
common law of master and servant, for example, and the factories and mines legislation.8  Any 
discussion of collective bargaining in legal textbooks tended to be most notable by its absence, or 
brevity.9  By 1965, Kahn-Freund had, of course, published a number of works which lent 
coherence to the field by way of the elucidation of the principle of collective laissez-faire.10 It is 
presumably to these works that Wedderburn referred in the Preface to the first edition, when he 
stated that there had, ‘been created in this decade a new recognition of the coherence of Labour 
Law as a subject of study’.11  Kahn-Freund had not attempted to write a comprehensive 
textbook, however, nor anywhere otherwise to analyse the field in its entirety.  Here was the gap, 
then, that Wedderburn intended to plug.12 
 
The second great strength of The Worker and the Law identified by Hepple was the clarity with 
which it explained its subject matter.  By its own assertion, the text was intended for ‘the general 
reader and student of our social and legal system’, rather than for the academic community, or 
legal practitioners.13  Its aim was to provide ‘a simple account of the relationship between British 
workers and the law’; ‘a general guide to the impact of law on the field of employment’,14 and it 
did so, in the words of Bill McCarthy, with the help of a ‘profusion of diagrams and quite a few 
jokes’.15  Following a discussion of the ‘Foundations’ of the subject, the text provided an 
analysis of inter alia the contract of employment, collective bargaining, compensation for injury 
at work, industrial conflict, and the relationship between trade unions and their members.  For 
McCarthy, it achieved a ‘comprehensiveness and lucidity ... that professionals respected and 
                                                          
7 Hepple, 219; Worker and the Law, 1st ed, Preface: Wedderburn claimed to provide a simple account of the subject 
‘for the first time’. 
8 Hepple 217 
9 Hepple 217 
10 Especially: Kahn-Freund, ‘Legal Framework’; Kahn-Freund, ‘Intergroup Conflicts and their Settlement’; Kahn-
Freund, ‘Labour Law’.   
11 Worker and the Law, 1st ed, Preface 
12 Worker and the Law, 1st ed, Preface 
13 Worker and the Law, 1st ed, Preface 
14 Worker and the Law, 1st ed, Preface, my emphasis.   
15 B McCarthy, Lord Wedderburn of Charlton Obituary, The Guardian, Monday 12 March, 2012 
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novices could follow’.16  Hepple recalled that, ‘one could safely recommend the 1st and 2nd 
editions to intelligent shop stewards or managers who wanted an overview of labour law’.17   
 
As to the theory of labour law presented in The Worker and the Law, it seems quite clear that – 
in this respect, as in others – Wedderburn followed the teachings of Kahn-Freund quite closely.  
In his analyses of British labour law published in the 50s, Kahn-Freund had emphasised the 
extent to which collective bargaining had developed and proceeded, in the UK, autonomously of 
the state.18  Attempts to regulate industrial relations by means of statute had tended to aim at 
encouraging, rather than compelling, the parties to bargain with one another, and the state had 
not taken steps to influence directly the outcomes of the bargaining process: the specific terms of 
collective agreements.19  On the basis of this analysis, Kahn-Freund had characterised the British 
system as ‘abstentionist’, or ‘non-interventionist’; as guided by the principle of ‘collective 
laissez-faire’.20  In places, and especially where he sought to compare the UK with other 
jurisdictions, he had come close to suggesting that the state, and ‘state’ law, had been 
insignificant in the development and practice of British industrial relations: ‘Trade union 
“recognition” was achieved in this country by purely industrial as distinct from political and 
legislative action...  The proud edifice of collective labour regulation was built up without the 
assistance of the “law”’.21     
 
In The Worker and the Law, Wedderburn embraced this vision of trade unions, and a system of 
collective bargaining, proudly independent of the state.  Each of the three editions opened with 
the memorable claim that, ‘Most workers want nothing more of the law than that it should leave 
them alone’.22  The defining characteristic of British industrial relations, when compared with 
                                                          
16 McCarthy, Obituary 
17 Hepple 219 
18 Kahn-Freund, ‘Legal Framework’; Kahn-Freund, ‘Intergroup Conflicts and their Settlement’; Kahn-Freund, 
‘Labour Law’ 
19 See further R Dukes, ‘Otto Kahn-Freund and Collective Laissez-Faire: an Edifice without a Keystone?’ (2009) 72 
Modern Law Review 220-46 
20 See eg ‘Legal Framework’ 123; ‘Labour Law’ 224 
21 O Kahn-Freund, ‘Collective Agreements under War Legislation’ (1943) 6 Modern Law Review 112-43, 143. See 
also ‘Intergroup Conflicts’, 44; ‘Labour Law’, 224; P Davies and M Freedland (eds), Labour and the Law, 3rd ed 
(London 1983). 52-3 
22 Worker and the Law, 1st ed, 9. 
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those of other democracies, was that they were ‘so little regulated by law’.23  And the history of 
labour law in the UK was best recounted as an answer to the question, why that should have been 
the case: why was it that the system which emerged from the nineteenth century ‘expressed ‘non-
intervention’ by the law’?24  In the Preface to the first edition, Wedderburn recorded his gratitude 
to ‘Professor O. Kahn-Freund, to whom I, like every other student of our Labour Law, owe a 
great debt’.  In all three editions, he referred to Kahn-Freund explicitly and always with 
approval, as the ‘leading authority of the post-war era’.25  So, for example, according to 
Wedderburn, collective agreements were ‘“intended, as it is sometimes put, to be ‘binding in 
honour’ only”’;26 on the labour side, power was collective power.27  Where Kahn-Freund wasn’t 
directly cited, there were nonetheless strong echoes of his analysis and his vocabulary.  The 
British system, Wedderburn explained, was informed and underpinned by notions of freedom 
and democracy.28  The worker’s freedom to combine in ‘autonomous’ associations was essential 
so as ‘to alleviate his subordination’.29  ‘Autonomous collective bargaining’ was paramount, and 
collective bargaining assumed ‘freedom for workers to organize in independent trade unions, to 
bargain independently and effectively with the employer’.30  Little effort was made by 
Wedderburn to depart from, or to critique, Kahn-Freund’s theory of collective laissez-faire.  His 
aim appears rather to have been to communicate and to explain that principle as a ‘useful 
rationalization’ of the field – as that which leant the field coherence – and thereafter to use it as a 
framework through which to offer a comprehensive analysis of the law, filling in some of the 
detail thus far omitted by Kahn-Freund and other scholars.31   
 
Closely linked to the idea of collective laissez-faire as developed by Kahn-Freund and articulated 
by Wedderburn was a particular approach to labour law scholarship.32  In the law textbooks 
otherwise available in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the scant attention paid to collective 
                                                          
23 Here, Wedderburn cited Phelps-Brown rather than Kahn-Freund: H Phelps-Brown, The Growth of British 
Industrial Relations (1959), 355.  Cited Worker and the Law, 1st ed, 9. 
24 Lord Wedderburn, The Worker and the Law 3rd ed (Harmondsworth 1986), 16 
25 Worker and the Law, 3rd ed, 5 
26 Worker and the Law 1st ed, 107, citing Kahn-Freund, ‘Legal Framework, 57-8 
27 Worker and the Law, 3rd ed, 7.  Here Wedderburn omits the citation: Labour and the Law, 3rd ed, 49 
28 Worker and the Law 3rd ed, 7 
29 Worker and the Law 3rd ed, 7 
30 Worker and the Law 3rd ed, 7 
31 Worker and the Law 3rd ed, 18; Worker and the Law 1st ed, Preface; Hepple, 223 
32 Lord Wedderburn, ‘Otto Kahn-Freund and British Labour Law’ in Wedderburn, Lewis, Clark, Labour Law and 
Industrial Relations, 29-31 
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bargaining could be understood to follow, almost as a matter of course, from the positivistic or 
black-letter style of legal analysis favoured by their authors.33  Concerned only to explain the 
text of the relevant statutory provisions and judicial authority, these authors quite naturally 
devoted only a few short passages to collective bargaining: to the rules contained in the Trade 
Disputes Act 1906, and the one or two court decisions pertaining to their interpretation.  
Schooled, in contrast, by Hugo Sinzheimer to consider the historical and sociological 
significance of the law in addition to its terms – the ‘real’ rule as well as the ‘formal norm’34 – 
Kahn-Freund, and Wedderburn after him, accorded a much greater measure of importance to 
collective bargaining.35  Taking inspiration most likely from the Webbs, Sinzheimer, Kahn-
Freund, and Wedderburn each studied the terms of collective agreements in addition to those of 
the relevant cases and statutes.36  Collective agreements and union rule books were included in 
Wedderburn’s 1967 Cases and Materials on Labour Law.37  In the Preface to the first edition of 
The Worker and the Law, he thanked, in addition to the scholars Kahn-Freund and Paul 
O’Higgins, the solicitor Brian Thompson and trade unionist Jim Mortimer: ‘for discussions on 
practical points of law and trade union affairs that brought me into closer touch with them’.38   
 
Of course, the articulation of collective laissez-faire by Kahn-Freund, and later Wedderburn, was 
also closely informed by the political convictions of the two scholars.  Both began their analyses 
of labour law and industrial relations from a recognition of the existence of conflicts of interest 
between labour and capital; the workforce and management; the employee and employer.39  
Recognising the inevitability and the universality of conflicts of interest, each scholar was 
concerned too with questions of power: with inequalities of power, and with the vulnerability of 
the worker in his relationship with the employer.40  The subordination of the worker to the 
employer (of labour to capital) was understood, with Sinzheimer and the Webbs, to be contrary 
                                                          
33 Hepple 217-8; Wedderburn ‘Kahn-Freund and British Labour Law’, 31 
34 O Kahn-Freund, ‘Hugo Sinzheimer’ in R Lewis and J Clark, Labour Law and Politics in the Weimar Republic 
(Oxford 1981). 98 
35 See further R Dukes, The Labour Constitution (Oxford 2014), esp. 197-200 
36 According to Kahn-Freund, Sinzheimer was ‘very much influenced by the Webbs’: O Kahn-Freund, ‘Postscript’ 
in Lewis and Clark, 196.  Wedderburn refers to the Webbs frequently in the first edition of Worker and the Law. 
37 (Cambridge 1967), cited Hepple, 218 
38 Worker and the Law, 1st ed, Preface 
39 Worker and the Law, 1st ed, 340; Kahn-Freund, Labour and the Law, 26-8 
40 Worker and the Law, 1st ed, 32 
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to the principle of democracy.41  Industrial democracy demanded the empowerment or 
emancipation of the worker, and collectivization and collective bargaining were the best means 
of achieving it.  Embodied in the principle of collective laissez-faire was advocacy of the 
collectivization of labour, and of respect for the autonomy of trade unions and collective 
industrial relations.   
 
In the case of Kahn-Freund, a preference for a wide measure of union autonomy was evident 
already in work written in the 1920s and 30s on Weimar labour law, and appears to have been 
linked to his adherence to a form of liberalism that involved a deep-seated mistrust of too great a 
measure of state intervention in industrial relations.42  ‘I always regarded myself as a liberal’, he 
reflected in later years, ‘more in the American than the German sense, with a small ‘l’. The idea of 
individual freedom had greater weight for me than for my more strongly Marxist-oriented friends at that 
time’.43  In the Weimar Republic, as in the England of the 1950s, Kahn-Freund believed that the 
government should not ‘interfere’ directly with collective bargaining or collective dispute 
resolution, and that courts should not be entrusted with the task of adjudicating industrial 
disputes.   
 
Wedderburn, too, emphasised, time and again, the importance of trade union autonomy, and the 
inappropriateness of law courts as a forum for the resolution of industrial conflicts.  His firmly 
held belief was that the judiciary tended, almost as a matter of course, to be guided in their 
decision-making by a wish to further the interests of their own – employing, capital-owning – 
class.44  It was for that reason that trade unions wished industrial disputes to be kept out of the 
courts;45 and, it was for that reason that a wider social consensus had emerged that this should be 
so.46  ‘Judges, employers, unions, and the legislature have combined to agree on one point, 
namely that, whatever else was done about industrial conflict and labour relations, the lawyers 
                                                          
41 Worker and the Law, 1st ed, 342 
42 Dukes, ‘Otto Kahn-Freund and Collective Laissez-Faire?’  
43 O Kahn-Freund, ‘Autobiographische Erinnerungen an die Weimarer Republik. Ein Gespräch mit Wolfgang 
Luthardt’ (1981) 14 Kritische Justiz 183-200, 189, my translation. 
44 Worker and the Law 1st ed, 341 
45 Worker and the Law 1st ed, 20 
46 See eg Lord Scrutton writing in 1920, cited 1st ed, 20; Winston Churchill speaking in 1911: ‘It is not good for 
trade unions that they should be brought in contact with the courts, and it is not good for the courts’, cited: Kahn-
Freund, ‘Labour Law’, 15  
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must be kept out’.47  As presented by Wedderburn in The Worker and the Law, the abstentionist 
tradition in British industrial relations meant, above all, the keeping of disputes out of the 
courts.48   
 
In later work, as we shall see, Wedderburn was mildly critical of Kahn-Freund’s tendency to 
over-emphasise, at times, the extent to which the state had truly ‘abstained’, and did truly 
abstain, from the sphere of industrial relations.  The suggestion inherent in the idea of abstention 
of no or only limited law (and extralegal state intervention) was misleading: what was singular 
about the British system was the character rather than the quantity of labour law.49  In making 
this point, Wedderburn readily convinced.  To suggest that British trade unions achieved 
recognition by reason of their industrial might alone was greatly to underemphasise both the 
importance of state support for the construction of collective bargaining machinery, and the 
significance of employer preferences in shaping state policy.50  As Wedderburn must have been 
aware, however, the criticism that he made of Kahn-Freund could equally have been levelled at 
some of his own statements and claims in The Worker and the Law, especially the first edition of 
the text.51   
[O]n some occasions the foreign observer looks in vain for what he would recognize as 
‘Labour Law’ in Britain... Writers on the subject face the paradox that their subject has, 
until recently, been thought by most lawyers not to exist at all.52    
In the third edition of The Worker and the Law – in recognition, in part, of the significant 
changes to the legal framework and to society that had occurred by that time – the discussion 
was a little more nuanced.53  But Wedderburn remained capable of overstating his case, and of 
                                                          
47 Worker and the Law 1st ed, 25 
48 Worker and the Law 1st ed, 342 
49 See further part II below. 
50 KD Ewing, ‘The State and Industrial Relations: “Collective laissez-faire” Revisited’ (1998) 5 Historical Studies in 
Industrial Relations 1; A Flanders, ‘The Tradition of Voluntarism’ (1974) 12 British Journal of Industrial Relations 
352-70; C Howell, Trade Unions and the State: The Construction of Industrial Relations Institutions in Britain, 
1890-2000, (Princeton 2005). 
51 See p 5 above.  Is there a hint of an admission of guilt in his 1995 explanation of the importance to British labour 
law of compulsory arbitration, a fact, he then suggested, that had been ‘widely undervalued by us all’? : ‘Change, 
Struggle and Ideology in British Labour Law’ in Lord Wedderburn, Labour Law and Freedom: Further Essays in 
Labour Law (London 1995).  11 
52 Worker and the Law 1st ed, 9 
53 Compare Worker and the Law 1st ed, 9 with 3rd ed, 1, and the discussion in 3rd ed, 846-7 
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endorsing the overstatements of others: for example, when he cited with approval the claim that, 
compared with the rest of Europe, British industrial relations had ‘a state-less structure’.54   
 
An explanation for the tendency to exaggerate or over-simplify the discussion of the role of the 
state in industrial relations can perhaps be found in the intention that Wedderburn had had in 
1965 to provide a ‘simple account’, or ‘introduction’, for ‘the general reader’, avoiding 
‘technical detail’.55  Perhaps it owed something, too, to the novelty of the ideas at the time and to 
Wedderburn’s enthusiasm for them: to the perception that the subject of labour law had been 
born in the UK with the 1950s contributions of Kahn-Freund, with the exposition of the principle 
of collective laissez-faire, and the demonstration of the benefits of an historical and sociological 
approach to the study of the field. ‘How heartening it was’, wrote Wedderburn years later, ‘to 
read an analysis giving a shape to a system which conventional lawyers were still wont to 
describe as ‘the law of contract and tort’, if not ‘master and servant’’.56  The prevailing mood has 
been captured by Hepple, recalling his own experience of reading Wedderburn’s early work:  he 
felt, he explained, ‘like Keats when first looking on Chapman’s Homer ... “Like some watcher of 
the skies/When a new planet swims into his ken”’.57  This was not the time for too great a 
measure of caution.58 
 
 
III Reflections on Collective Laissez-Faire 
 
The crucial question is not ‘how much’ [law] but: of what sort and to what end?59 
 
In other work, Wedderburn reflected more directly, and at length, on Kahn-Freund’s scholarship 
and the meaning of the principle of collective laissez-faire.60  In 1981, he wrote a lecture in 
                                                          
54 Worker and the Law 3rd ed, 848 
55 Worker and the Law 1st ed, Preface, my emphasis 
56 ‘Change, Struggle and Ideology’, 24 
57 Hepple, 217-8 
58 CF Wedderburn’s reference to Kahn-Freund’s ‘more extreme formulations’ written ‘in the first flush of his grand 
design’: ‘Change, Struggle and Ideology’, 25 
59 Worker and the Law, 3rd ed, 860 
60 Discussion here focuses on ‘Kahn-Freund and British Labour Law’, and on the 1995 chapter, ‘Change, Struggle 
and Ideology’ 
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honour of Kahn-Freund and Sinzheimer, which took the form of a review of Kahn-Freund’s 
contribution to labour law, organised chronologically.61  As was no doubt appropriate in that 
context, the lecture was highly complimentary.  Kahn-Freund had ‘revolutionized the study, the 
teaching, and the very character of labour law in Britain’.62  Collective laissez-faire was ‘a 
scholarly feat of genius’, encapsulating ‘a brilliant and compelling intellectual judgment’; Kahn-
Freund was a ‘giant among scholars’; his passing a ‘tragedy’ for labour law.63  Did Wedderburn 
risk the charge of exaggeration, or even puffery, with these remarks?  Certainly he appeared to 
overstate, in places, the originality of Kahn-Freund’s arguments; for example, in the course of 
his discussion of the contractual force of collective agreements under UK law.64  The suggestion 
there was that Kahn-Freund had deduced for himself the answer to the question, why such 
agreements were never enforced as contracts between the parties, and had been the first to 
explain the matter to others.65  In fact, Kahn-Freund’s classification of collective agreements as 
not contractually binding followed, in the words of Hugh Clegg, the ‘generally accepted account 
of the working of British collective bargaining at that time’.66  In as early as 1929, Walter Milne-
Bailey had written that:  
‘The Agreement itself … is a ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ only.  It is not legally binding, as 
such, though its terms may expressly or by implication become the terms of the 
individual contract of employment.’67 
And in his 1959 article on ‘Intergroup Conflicts’, Kahn-Freund had cited Milne-Bailey as 
authority for the point.68   
 
When it came to the identification of the principle of collective laissez-faire as a rationalization 
for the legal unenforceability of collective agreements together with further characteristics of the 
law, the ascription of originality to Kahn-Freund was likely rather more warranted.69  In turning 
                                                          
61 The Sixth Hugo Sinzheimer Memorial Lecture, published as ‘Kahn-Freund and British Labour Law’ 
62 ‘Kahn-Freund and British Labour Law’, 29 
63 ‘Kahn-Freund and British Labour Law’: 38, 45, 47, 67, 69-70 
64 ‘Kahn-Freund and British Labour Law’, 43 
65 ‘Kahn-Freund and British Labour Law’, 43 
66 H Clegg, ‘Otto Kahn-Freund and British Industrial Relations’ in Wedderburn, Lewis and Clark (eds), 24.   
67 W Milne-Bailey, Trade Union Documents (London: Bell & Sons, 1929). 212; Cited: Kahn-Freund ‘Intergroup 
Conflicts’, 210, note 68 
68 Kahn-Freund, ‘Intergroup Conflicts’ 210, fn 68 
69 Though cf Sinzheimer’s discussion of ‘collective liberalism’: ‘Die Reform des Schlichtungswesens’, in H 
Sinzheimer, Arbeitsrecht und Rechtssoziologie (Europaïsche Verlagsanstalt, 1976). 243 
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to address the meaning of the principle, Wedderburn departed, to some extent, from the picture 
painted in the first edition of The Worker and the Law of a system of industrial relations 
developing and functioning largely independently of the state.  He charted a progression in 
Kahn-Freund’s thinking from a description of the ‘attitude of the law’ in 1954 as ‘one of 
abstention and neutrality’, to a preference already in 1959 for the terms ‘non-intervention’ and 
‘collective laissez-faire’.70  The progression was to be approved, Wedderburn suggested, because 
the latter terms more clearly reflected what was most significant about the British system: the 
historical emergence of the ‘method of Collective Bargaining’ as the primary means of 
governing industrial relations.71  He then identified a distinction, returned to in later work, 
between the ‘descriptive’ and ‘prescriptive’ aspects of the principle.72  Collective laissez-faire, 
he suggested, was ‘primarily descriptive of [that] historical process and its bequest to a particular 
era’, but it also implied Kahn-Freund’s approval of the relative unimportance of legal sanctions 
in the UK (note that the reference was not, now, to the law more generally): a sign of the 
maturity of British industrial relations.73   
 
If, for the moment, Wedderburn was content to endorse both the descriptive and prescriptive 
aspects, it was also the case that his discussion of changes to the legal framework during the 
1970s and early 1980s focused less on the ‘significance of legal sanctions’ to industrial relations 
than it did on the principles or ‘values’ that could be said to underpin the notion of collective 
laissez-faire.74  Paramount among these was the principle of respect for free and autonomous 
trade unionism.  It was by attacking autonomous trade unionism that the 1971 Industrial 
Relations Act had constituted a – temporary – end to voluntarism, and by restoring respect 
therefor that the legislation of 1974-76 had ushered in a return of the collective laissez-faire 
system.75  To make that claim, of course, was to suggest that the principle of collective laissez-
faire had been respected by the Labour governments of the 1970s notwithstanding their 
institution of ‘a vastly expanded’ floor of individual legal rights dealing with unfair dismissal, 
redundancy, discrimination, and maternity, and a set of collective rights including a statutory 
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recognition procedure.76  The suggestion, in other words, was that the existence of a significant 
body of statutory labour rights, individual and collective, was not inimical to respect for 
collective laissez-faire.   
 
In the last sections of the lecture, Wedderburn turned to the question of the future development 
of labour law in the politically polarised context of 1981, following the death of Kahn-Freund in 
1979.  If it could quite quickly be concluded that many of the old arguments and ways of 
thinking – the ‘old charts’ – had lost their currency, it was equally clear that the values which 
‘lay behind’ collective laissez-faire were as important then as they had been in the 1950s.77  
These were:  
a passionate belief in democratic values, alongside a clear vision of the subordination and 
injustice to which the worker is committed by the very act of selling his labour.  From 
that very subordination springs the moral right of ordinary men and women to associate 
together, to speak freely, and to act collectively.78 
The task now for labour law scholars, Wedderburn suggested, was ‘ceaselessly to re-examine the 
place of law not only abstractly in society, but also concretely in the lives of ... millions of 
working men and women’, holding on, always, to the ‘rich gifts’ that Kahn-Freund had 
bequeathed to them.79  
 
In the course of the 1980s, a number of prominent scholars of UK labour law took up the theme 
of the outdatedness of ‘the old charts’ for navigating the subject, developing it in ways which 
would not meet, ultimately, with Wedderburn’s full approval.  In their 1983 editors’ introduction 
to the third edition of Kahn-Freund’s Labour and the Law, Paul Davies and Mark Freedland 
expressed their dissatisfaction with the principle of collective laissez-faire as a means of 
explaining the primary policy concerns and objectives of government.80  In implying that the 
main focus of scholarly endeavour should lie with voluntary collective bargaining, the principle 
encouraged scholars to take their eye off the ball of what had, in fact, been the central concern of 
                                                          
76 ‘Kahn-Freund and British Labour Law’, 54 
77 ‘Kahn-Freund and British Labour Law’, 68 
78 ‘Kahn-Freund and British Labour Law’, 69 
79 ‘Kahn-Freund and British Labour Law’, 70 
80 A version of the introduction was published in 1982 as: P Davies and M Freedland, ‘Labour Law and the Public 
Interest: Collective Bargaining and Economic Policy’ in Wedderburn and Murphy (eds), Labour Law and the 
Community: Perspectives for the 1980s (London 1982) 
14 
 
a succession of governments in the postwar era: the control of inflation and the maintenance, at 
the same time, of high levels of employment.81  If labour law, as an academic discipline, was to 
‘maintain its credentials as offering an explanatory framework of the legal regime within which 
the employment relation operates’, Davies and Freedland argued, scholars of the subject ought to 
re-orientate their studies and their writing to reflect more accurately these policy priorities and 
strategies, and to take account of legislation and government activity aimed at their 
implementation.82  In 1987, Hugh Collins developed a more sustained critique of the 
‘abstentionist tradition’, identifying what he understood to be the need for ‘greater legal 
intervention’ in labour relations to secure respect for the values of democracy, the Rule of Law, 
and fairness.83  As a basis for his critique, Collins defined abstentionism, or collective laissez-
faire, as having at its core both a concern for the promotion of industrial democracy – to be 
achieved by means of the guarantee of a right to strike, and the institution of collective 
bargaining – and an ‘insistence of the impotence of law’ to achieve those aims.84  So defined, 
abstentionism and its proponents could be criticised for overestimating the capacity of collective 
bargaining to realize the ‘ideals of democracy’, and for grossly underestimating the significance 
and potential usefulness of legislation in shaping and directly regulating such relations.85 
 
In 1995, Wedderburn took the opportunity to mount a sustained defence of collective laissez-
faire.86  The main thrust of the defence involved the claim that those who criticised the principle 
did so on the basis of a flawed understanding of it.  In order to make this claim, Wedderburn 
drew the most nuanced picture yet of its meaning, suggesting again that the values at the core of 
collective laissez-faire remained relevant notwithstanding the changed political and economic 
conditions of the time.  Indeed, this was the primary argument of the piece as set out in its 
introduction:  
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Any ‘dialectic of progress’ needs to eschew hubris and learn from past societies at all 
levels.  And proponents of a new labour law cannot afford indiscriminate discardment of 
lessons from the past.87   
 
What were the still valuable lessons of the past?  Wedderburn was now quite emphatic that these 
did not include a blanket rejection, or disapproval, of state intervention in industrial relations, 
legal or extra-legal.88  The term collective laissez-faire had been coined by Kahn-Freund to 
describe, and to signal approval of, the ‘primacy’ of voluntary collective bargaining in British 
industrial relations, especially as compared with other countries.89  While it could be understood 
broadly to imply a specific kind of non-intervention or neutrality on the part of the state, it was 
certainly not synonymous with state abstentionism straight-forwardly understood.90  Collective 
laissez-faire meant that the state should – and did, for the most part – remain neutral as to the 
outcomes of collective bargaining and arbitration procedures.91  It captured well the existence of 
a preference on both sides of industry for voluntary collective bargaining, and for forms of 
dispute resolution that did not involve the courts.  And it described and advocated a system of 
industrial relations which involved, or reflected, state respect for those preferences.92  But it did 
not mean that there should be, or had been in the UK, no labour law.93  The picture painted by 
Kahn-Freund of British industrial relations, even in the 1950s, had not been one of ‘unrelieved 
‘abstention’; the ‘gloss’ on voluntarism which we saw added by legislation was on the contrary 
intervenient’.94  As had been explained by Kahn-Freund in his 1950s publications, a variety of 
legislative provisions and mechanisms had then existed which acted as a prop or support to 
collective bargaining.  And compulsory arbitration of one form or another had remained a central 
feature of British labour law from the 1940s until 1980, ‘in war and peace’.95  Taking all this into 
account, Wedderburn concluded that it was perhaps regrettable that Kahn-Freund had ever used 
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the term ‘abstention’, since this had allowed for the erroneous interpretation and premature 
rejection of collective laissez-faire by scholars such as Collins.96  
 
In developing his argument, Wedderburn now drew a distinction between three aspects of 
collective laissez-faire: the descriptive, prescriptive, and the ideological.  He approved the first of 
these, describing Kahn-Freund’s claim that the ‘proud edifice of collective labour regulation’ had 
been ‘built up without the assistance of the law’ as ‘historically undeniable’.97  The critical 
distinction, for both authors, appears to have been the fact that in the UK the Trade Disputes Act 
of 1906 created statutory immunities for trade unions, whereas elsewhere, they had been 
guaranteed positive legal rights, including rights to recognition.98  When it came to Kahn-
Freund’s ‘prescriptive’ characterisation of the British trade unions’ purported self-reliance as the 
‘distinguishing mark’ of a ‘mature’ system of industrial relations, however, Wedderburn was 
now more critical.99  Such characterisation was rash, he suggested, because it involved an 
overstatement of the insignificance of the state to the emergence and persistence of the British 
system.100  In any case, the most important aspect of collective laissez-faire was the third: that 
which offered ‘an understanding and justification of collective organisation in general, and in 
particular the need and right of workers to form, join and act in combination through autonomous 
trade unions, free from control by employers or by the State’.101  These were the core values 
which underlay the principle of collective laissez-faire, and which ought not to be too quickly 
dismissed by the current generation of labour law scholars.  As ideology, collective laissez-faire 
did not imply a rejection of the potential usefulness or importance of state – and statutory – 
interventions.  When considering routes to law reform which respected the ‘spirit of collective 
laissez-faire’, the question to be addressed by scholars was , ‘how the law can intervene 
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productively, directly or indirectly’.102  The search now for an alternative labour law would 
likely ‘on some occasions invoke methods of autonomous collective bargaining, on others the 
methods of enactment, usually the two together as has so often been the case’.103     
 
In this later work, then, Wedderburn expressed the view quite unambiguously that a programme 
of law reform could be developed in the ‘spirit of collective laissez-faire’, which involved the 
introduction of new and strengthened statutory rights, individual and collective.  It remained the 
case, in his opinion, that disputes involving employees and employers, unions and management, 
should be kept out of the ordinary courts, and for that reason he advocated the development of a 
system of labour courts with jurisdiction to decide all such cases.104  With that proviso, he 
referred to, among other things, the institution of new forms of worker participation and the 
strengthening of statutory rights to employment protection as possible elements of a programme 
of law reform.105  In making these points, Wedderburn presented his own understanding of 
collective laissez-faire as the orthodox one: as that which could be gleaned from the most 
accurate reading of Kahn-Freund’s work, and its relation to historical fact.  Where he did admit 
of significant points of disagreement between himself and the senior scholar – for example, in 
respect of the question whether the introduction of a ‘floor’ of individual statutory rights 
signalled the end of the era of collective laissez-faire – he explained these with the suggestion 
that Kahn-Freund had departed from or contradicted the principle!106   
 
 
IV Bullock and the Land of Industrial Democracy 
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The conjunction of unity and conflict – the ‘conflictual partnership’ – which we see as 
characteristic of collective bargaining, is likely to be the hallmark of board-level relations.107 
 
As an advisor to the TUC and as a Labour Party peer, Lord Wedderburn was directly involved in 
formulating recommendations for law reform over a period of several decades.108  In some 
instances, he succeeded in influencing the development of the common law, as for example when 
he persuaded the court in the Ford Motor Company case, acting as counsel for the trade union 
defendant, to follow Kahn-Freund’s teaching that collective agreements were not usually 
contractually binding.109  If we can infer from such endeavours a belief that an appropriate 
objective of legal scholarship was to influence government policy, legislation, and legal 
precedent, then this was another conviction that he shared with Kahn-Freund, and with 
Sinzheimer before him.110  Whereas Kahn-Freund, as a member of the Donovan Commission, 
had famously advocated the maintenance, in essence, of the existing voluntarist system, 
however, the recommendations and proposals authored or co-authored by Wedderburn in later 
years often involved the taking of more interventionist steps by government.111  In the mid-
1990s, for example, with a realistic prospect at last of a Labour Party victory in the next general 
election, he assisted the TUC in the compiling of a report, Your Voice at Work, which 
recommended the introduction of a fairly comprehensive statutory framework creating new 
rights to representation: individual representation in meetings with an employer, consultation, 
and recognition.112  As member of the Bullock Committee from 1975-77, he participated in the 
development of proposals for the instatement of worker directors on company boards.113 
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New legislation to allow for the board-level representation of workers was first proposed by the 
TUC in 1974, and included in the Labour Party manifesto for the general election of that year.  
Reporting in January 1977, the Committee of Inquiry on Industrial Democracy, chaired by Lord 
Bullock, recommended in outline that trade union worker-directors be appointed to the boards of 
private-sector companies with at least 2000 employees, subject to approval by all employees in a 
secret ballot.114  In the face of quite vehement opposition to the proposals on the part of the CBI, 
the Conservative Party, and multinational business leaders, and of explicit threats of heightened 
industrial action and economic destabilization, the Labour government did not ever legislate to 
implement them.115  On the question of their merits, Kahn-Freund and Lord Wedderburn 
famously disagreed.  Writing in anticipation of a white paper, each detailed his arguments in a 
pair of articles published in this journal in 1977.116   
 
Kahn-Freund opposed the Bullock proposals on a number of grounds.  In explanation of his 
opposition, he referred to the original, ‘ineffective’ provisions for employee representation on 
company boards contained in the Weimar labour statutes of the 1920s.117  With the aim of 
undermining the potential influence of the employee representatives appointed by virtue of the 
statutes, company boards in the Weimar Republic had developed the practice of transferring 
decision-making powers to committees to which no employees were admitted.118  Kahn-Freund’s 
general ‘scepticism’ towards employee representation in organs of corporate governance dated, 
he explained, from that time: ‘how difficult it is, at an advanced age to abandon firm views 
formed in the past’!119  It was also informed – as is quite clear from the nature of his arguments – 
by his firmly pluralist understanding of industrial relations:120 his long-held belief in the 
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inevitability and universality of conflicts of interest between the two sides of industry, and his 
deeply held scepticism regarding the possibility of eradicating them.121   
 
The first objection raised by him to the Bullock proposals was, quite straightforwardly, that the 
new mechanisms were unlikely to be effective.  Given the different interests of the employee and 
shareholder representatives, the board would operate as an ‘institutionalised coalition’, quite 
unsuited to the day-to-day management of the company.122  Consequent to the appointment of 
worker-directors, it would likely become restricted in its functions, with the role of senior 
management expanded accordingly.123  A second, closely related, concern arose by reason of the 
legal duty that was to be placed upon boards, according to the proposals, to represent ‘the 
company’s’ interests.124  This was problematic, Kahn-Freund thought, because, while the so-
called ‘interest of the company’ was always coincident with an interest of the shareholders, 
situations could arise where it would be wholly opposed to the interests of the workers.125  
Simply positing a unitary set of ‘company’ interests could not solve the underlying problem of 
the existence of conflicts of interests arising between employees and shareholders.  By reason of 
the imposition of the legal duty, then, the employee representatives would be exposed ‘to a 
conflict of duties which is simply insoluble’, representing simultaneously the interests of the 
workforce, and the so-called ‘interest of the company’.126   
 
A third objection related to the absence in the British system of a lower tier of worker 
representation – a ‘substructure’ – functionally equivalent to the works councils of the (postwar, 
more effective) West German system.127  While the Bullock committee had recognised the 
importance of a robust substructure – ‘changes at the board level are not themselves sufficient to 
ensure an extension of industrial democracy ... a sufficiently well developed structure of 
participation below the board is clearly vital’ – it had concluded that existing, voluntary, 
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arrangements in the UK were robust enough.128  The committee had in any case been restricted 
in terms of its remit to consider the problem of board-level representation, and the TUC had 
rejected any possibility of a ‘statutory substructure’ on the grounds that it might pose a threat to 
union organisation at plant level.  In Kahn-Freund’s opinion, the failure to formalise or 
institutionalise a system of worker representation at plant level was problematic.  In existing 
systems of codetermination, including the German, the plant was the real focal point: the site 
most proximate to workers, where the issues of most importance to workers were decided.129  
Key to the effectiveness of the German system, in Kahn-Freund’s opinion, was the wide range of 
statutory rights that works councils enjoyed to codetermination in matters of job security, 
dismissals, the transfer of ownership of plants.130  To be effective, he wrote, an edifice of 
statutory participation had to be built from the bottom upwards.131        
 
Writing together with Paul Davies, Wedderburn responded to each of these objections.  The first 
and most important argument put forward by the two related to Kahn-Freund’s concerns 
regarding conflicts of interests between employee directors and shareholder directors.  In Davies’ 
and Wedderburn’s opinion, it was quite simply wrong to suggest that the Bullock Committee had 
proposed that such conflicts be ignored or suppressed; that it had assumed a ‘unity of interest 
between employer and employee’.132  To the contrary, the proposals were directed precisely at 
facilitating the introduction of a mechanism of corporate governance that would allow for the 
expression and resolution of conflicts.133  The reference in the proposals to the ‘interests’ of the 
company was not intended to imply, as Kahn-Freund had understood, the existence of a ‘self-
perpetuating entity ... whose “interests” transcend those of any of its component elements’.134  
As would fall to be clarified quite explicitly within the new legislation, the phrase ‘the 
company’s best interests’ was meant rather as a shorthand way of referring to two sets of (quite 
possible competing) interests, those of the employees, and those of the shareholders.135  It 
followed that the crucial question for the board of directors would be that of how to strike a 
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balance between the two.136  Kahn-Freund had been quite wrong, Davies and Wedderburn 
concluded, to draw a distinction between collective bargaining and board level worker 
representation on the basis that the first proceeded ‘on the pluralistic pattern’, and the second ‘on 
the unitary pattern’.137  In practice, board level representation implemented in line with the 
Bullock proposals was likely to function quite similarly to collective bargaining as a ‘conflictual 
partnership’ between the representatives of each side of industry.138 
 
On the question of ‘substructure’ – workplace codetermination or representation – Davies and 
Wedderburn understood Kahn-Freund to be concerned specifically with the absence of a 
statutory framework in the British system.  His argument or assertion, as they understood it, was 
that ‘only a legally created substructure [would] be able to carry the weight of employee 
representation on the board’.139  With this, they disagreed.  It was certainly true that a well-
developed substructure would be important to the effectiveness of any system of company board 
worker representation, as the Bullock Committee had acknowledged:   
Not only does participation begin with issues close to the daily concerns of employees 
and progress gradually from these to longer-range, more complex questions, but the 
people who represent their fellow employees begin by contributing to the solution of day-
to-day problems and thereby gain experience and skill that can be progressively applied 
to more difficult questions.140  
But it was equally the case that a well-developed substructure, involving participation for 
workers in deciding a wide range of questions, and strong links with board-level representation, 
could develop and function quite happily without ‘statutory help’.141  Recent survey evidence 
suggested that the existing system of shop steward representation in the UK was well-developed 
indeed, involving ‘a greater degree of joint regulation than could be found in all works councils 
systems ... with the possible exception of the German system’.142  For Davies and Wedderburn, 
                                                          
136 Davies and Wedderburn, 202 
137 Davies and Wedderburn, 203, citing Kahn-Freund, ‘Industrial Democracy’, 76  
138 Davies and Wedderburn, 203 
139 Davies and Wedderburn, 209, my emphasis 
140 Davies and Wedderburn, 209, citing Commission on Industrial Relations, Workplace Industrial Relations 1972 
(1974) [Bullock Report], 41 
141 Davies and Wedderburn, 209 
142 Davies and Wedderburn, 210, citing Bullock Report, 30 
23 
 
then, the statutory nature or otherwise of the participative machinery below board level was not a 
matter of any significance.143  
 
Given Kahn-Freund’s reputation as the architect and chief proponent of the principle of 
collective laissez-faire, and his often-voiced scepticism regarding the likely efficacy of statutory 
interventions in industrial relations, the nature of the criticism levelled at him by Davies and 
Wedderburn is rather surprising: that, on this occasion, he doubted the strength and substance of 
the existing British system of workplace representation on the very grounds that it was voluntary 
and not statutory.  An alternative, and arguably more convincing, interpretation of Kahn-
Freund’s argument is that he questioned the adequacy of shop steward representation in the UK 
on the basis that it was not sufficiently formalised or institutionalised, either by statute or by 
collective agreement, sectoral, or cross-sectoral.144  A statutory system of board representation 
would not sit happily, in his opinion, upon an informal, voluntary system of workplace 
representation because, without some method of formalisation, there would be no clear 
articulation of the relationship between decision-making regarding the ‘daily concerns of 
employees’, on the one hand, and the ‘longer-range, more complex questions’ on the other, to 
use the terms of the Bullock Report.145  In the conclusion to his article, Kahn-Freund 
emphasised, again, his general scepticism regarding the efficacy of statutory ‘“frameworks” for 
collective labour relations’.146  If implemented, he wrote, the Bullock proposals would ‘introduce 
at a sensitive point of these relations a measure of legalism which may be excessive’.147  Board 
level representation could only work if the unions and management together wished it to work: 
legislation could not be relied upon to engender the ‘measure of understanding’ between the two 
sides necessary to the success of such an innovation.148   
 
On the basis of this alternative reading of Kahn-Freund’s article, it might be argued that it was, 
after all, Davies and Wedderburn who placed greater weight on the significance of statute in the 
context of board-level representation, and greater faith in the likely efficacy of a new legislative 
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framework.  All three authors agreed on the question of the existence of conflicts of interest 
between employees and shareholders.  In Kahn-Freund’s opinion, such conflicts would likely 
constitute an insurmountable hurdle to a board consisting of representatives of each side of 
industry in its efforts to decide matters relating to the day-to-day management of the company, 
and of greatest significance to the workforce.  In Davies’ and Wedderburn’s opinion, in contrast, 
the redefinition, in statute, of the interest of ‘the company’, and the duties of board members in 
acting in furtherance of that interest, might well be sufficient to engender the institution of a 
‘conflictual partnership’, involving the directors in a constant and beneficial balancing of 
competing interests. 
 
Support for this interpretation of the authors’ responses to Bullock can be found in the series of 
lectures delivered by Kahn-Freund the following year, and in Wedderburn’s reaction to them.149  
In light of the experience of the miners’ strikes of 1972 and 74, and the mass picketing involved, 
Kahn-Freund expressed a deep-seated concern in the course of the lectures regarding what he 
understood to be the changed nature of industrial action, its ‘social effects’, and the likely 
consequences for the labour movement.150  His fear was that the new forms of action caused 
harm directly to consumers, who were also workers; that if they continued to be prevalent, they 
might prove ‘suicidal’ for the trade unions.151    
[T]he strike as a social institution – once considered as the supreme example of working 
class solidarity – may have been dialectically transmuted into its opposite: groups of 
workers seeking advantages at the expense of others.152 
Responsibility for the increased use of such action lay, in his view, with the rank and file: with 
forms of ‘direct democracy’ within British trade unions, which meant that ‘irrationally motivated 
action’ was an ‘omnipresent danger’.153  There was an urgent need to bring greater order to 
industrial relations: greater discipline, though he did not use that term, to the labour movement.  
As in the case of the Bullock proposals, he was again sceptical regarding the likely effectiveness 
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of legal intervention.154  The solution could only lie, he suggested, with the development of more 
centralized forms of collective bargaining.  The TUC and the CBI should take greater control of 
their members, imposing order through the mechanism of centrally negotiated collective 
agreements.155   
 
As Wedderburn later remarked, there was continuity between Kahn-Freund’s concerns and 
proposals, and the diagnosis and recommendations of the Donovan Committee ten years 
previously.156  Then, and in his response to Bullock, and now to mass picketing, Kahn-Freund 
perceived the problem, or potential problem, to lie with a lack of coordination between the 
shopfloor – the ‘substructure’ – and the union leadership; with the ‘informality’ of the former.  
Then, as now, the solution proposed was shaped by his continued belief in the potential of the 
collective parties to regulate industrial relations autonomously: specifically, through the 
introduction of a greater degree of coordination between the levels of industrial organisation.  In 
1981, Wedderburn disagreed in the strongest of terms.157  By then, he suggested, the idea that the 
trade unions could save pluralist society by engaging in centralised collective bargaining had 
become ‘not so much Utopian as laughable’.158  The election of the Conservative Government in 
1979 had laid bare what had always been the case: that the significant conflicts of interest in 
capitalist society existed between labour, on the one side, and capital on the other, and not 
between different groups of workers as Kahn-Freund had seemed to suggest.159         
 
 
V  Conclusion 
 
No scholarship is possible without conviction, without a view of the totality.160 
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Lord Wedderburn’s scholarship in the field of labour law was deeply and unashamedly 
political.161  It was informed, above all, by his socialism: his concern with democracy, social 
justice, and inequalities between the social classes.  And it was directed, quite explicitly, at the 
advocacy of particular interpretations, or amendments, of the law: he made no secret, in his 
writing, of where his political sympathies lay.  He was a fantastic writer and communicator; 
invariably a joy to read. 
 
In his early writings on labour law, Wedderburn adopted the framework of collective laissez-
faire enthusiastically because it fitted with his existing political convictions.  It fitted too with his 
preferred approach to scholarship, which was broadly socio-legal and historical; what came to be 
referred to as a ‘law in context’ approach.  As Hepple has noted, Wedderburn came to labour law 
originally through a study of labour history.162  In the first edition of The Worker and the Law, 
the influence of the Webbs was manifest, and of the historians Eric Hobsbawm and Henry 
Phelps-Brown.  As we have seen, Wedderburn accorded significance in his early analyses of the 
field to collective bargaining and collective agreements as well as to the letter of the law.  His 
intention, always, was to analyse the terms of the law as experienced by actors.  The purpose of 
scholarship, in his view, was to assess the consequences for workers of particular laws and social 
arrangements with a view to influencing the formation of legal policy, legislation, and legal 
precedent.  ‘Projects for new labour laws must be tested in concrete terms by their effect upon 
real people, the condition and quality of their lives, their prosperity and their – real, not 
theoretical – liberty’.163 
 
Is it possible to identify in Wedderburn’s scholarship a theory of labour law that is clearly 
distinguishable from Kahn-Freund’s?  From the time of the first edition of The Worker and the 
Law, Wedderburn placed great emphasis, in his explanations of the evolution of the British 
‘system’ of labour law and industrial relations, on the trade unions’ wish, broadly accepted by 
society, to keep industrial disputes out of the courts.  In later interpretations of the meaning of 
collective laissez-faire, and in his 1995 defence of the principle, he emphasised the importance of 
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this preference again: collective laissez-faire was not so much an expression of a rejection of 
legislative intervention in industrial relations, he now explained, but of scepticism regarding the 
capacity of the ordinary courts to decide industrial disputes objectively.  In line with such 
scepticism, he advocated time and again the development of specialist labour courts, writing, 
famously, on the question of the ‘autonomy’ of labour law from the common law: ‘the autonomy 
of labour law has a broader sweep than the autonomy of the industrial parties’.164   
 
Like Kahn-Freund, Wedderburn often stated his belief in the importance of autonomous trade 
unions, as a matter both of historical fact and of political principle.  If the two scholars differed 
in respect of their theories of labour law, however, they did so here, regarding their 
understanding of what trade union ‘autonomy’ entailed or should entail.  Wedderburn, it seems, 
did not understand trade union autonomy to be threatened by interventions of the legislature in 
quite the way that Kahn-Freund did.  For Wedderburn, though not for Kahn-Freund, the creation 
of a statutory floor of rights, individual and collective, was not contradictory of the principle of 
collective laissez-faire; trade unionists could act as company directors within a legally-framed 
system of corporate governance without compromising their independence from the employer or 
the government; legislation might well prove an effective means of encouraging the institution of 
productive ‘conflictual partnerships’ between the trade unionists and the other directors on the 
board.   
 
All that said, it would be a mistake, I think, to overstate the differences of opinion that separated 
the two scholars on the question of the rightful role of the state in industrial relations.165  It ought 
to be borne in mind that Kahn-Freund’s views also changed throughout the course of his life; that 
in later work, he advocated a wider measure of direct government intervention than might have 
been suggested by his exposition of collective laissez-faire in the 1950s, giving consideration, for 
example, to the introduction of stricter controls of the closed shop and secondary picketing by 
way of legislation.166  Even in the works of the 1950s, he expended much pen ink describing and 
analysing, with approbation, the various ways in which the law circumscribed and supported the 
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collectivist system of industrial relations.167  As we have seen, Wedderburn himself did not often 
admit of significant points of disagreement with the older scholar.  Where he did criticize Kahn-
Freund, in rather strong terms, was in respect of the latter’s proposed solution to the challenges 
faced in British industrial relations in the 1970s: coordination of the different levels of industrial 
organisation through the increased use of centralized collective bargaining.  In Wedderburn’s 
view, this involved both a misdiagnosis and an unhelpful prescription: there was little evidence 
that ‘direct democracy’ was to blame for increased levels of industrial action, for example, and 
little chance that the collective parties could succeed in sorting things out for themselves, without 
the intervention of government.  Kahn-Freund was quite wrong to adhere still to his long-held 
view that the collective parties were capable of regulating industrial relations autonomously as 
they ought to be regulated, in furtherance of the public good. 
 
In the political context of the 1980s and 1990s, such differences of opinion were important 
because they allowed Wedderburn to construct a convincing argument in favour of the continued 
usefulness of collective laissez-faire as a framework for the scholarly analysis of labour law.  In 
the decades following Kahn-Freund’s death, the primary task for scholars, in Wedderburn’s 
view, was to identify ways of challenging the increasingly hegemonic free market ideology of 
Friedrich Hayek and others, so influential in shaping Conservative government policy and, by 
1995, even, common understandings of industrial relations.  (‘There are young people’, he wrote 
with a touch of black humour, ‘who believe that in the winter of 1979 not a single corpse was 
buried in England’!168)  Much of the Conservatives’ policies and legislation had been aimed, 
ostensibly, at allowing the common law back into industrial relations.  Cleansed of collective 
resistance, however, ‘free market’ conditions, like the common law, could serve only to 
disempower individuals, in the name of individualism.169  In the face of such an attack on social 
justice, the value of collective laissez-faire was that it allowed for the continued expression of 
demands for free trade unionism as a necessary element of an equitable society.  If the postwar 
social consensus in favour of a system of industrial relations designed to achieve a balance of 
social forces had broken down – if British society was now characterised by ‘class injustice’ – it 
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was clear that respect for collective laissez-faire would require much more from (a Labour) 
government than abstentionism, however understood: positive legal guarantees of the rights of 
workers in a way, always, which supported rather than undermined free trade unionism.170          
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